
Music and theat

in Germany

As early as 1882 musicians in Berlin founded a Philharmonic Orchestra, and from 1960 to 1963 the unique "Philharmonie" at the Kemperplatz in Berlin was built. 2,200 terraced seats with the podium in the centre. A place for great conductors, for great concerts. It shows that *Germany has castles and* palaces, cities and industry but also unusual temples of the arts. *Other examples are the theatre* set on a monumental flight of outdoor stairs in the medieval *town of Schwäbisch-Hall*; the Baroque garden theatre in Hanover-Herrenhausen; the theatre in the palace of Sch gen near Mannheim, founde 1749, and the Munich Opera Bavarian National Theatre; b 1811, burnt down later and re its full splendour *in* 1963. A pl grand and elegant music fest


National-Oper, Munich



Philharmonie, Berlin.



Beethovenstrasse 69, D-6000 Frank



The German Tribune

…burg, 25 January 1981
…tieth Year - No. 973 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C
ISSN 0016-8858

…nforcement problems in arms export control

DIE ZEIT

…the mid-70s the Shah of Persia or…ered half a dozen submarines in the …eral Republic of Germany at …200m each. *Downpayments were* …de and the first hulls were laid in …man yards when Khomeini's revolu…n sent the Shah packing.

Buyers for the six U-boats have since …n sought. India, for instance, showed …rest in three or four. A few months … two were *surreptitiously sold to* …eral Pinochet, the Chilean dictator.

As soon as news of the Chilean deal …ke, there was uproar among Germa…s Social Democrats. It had hardly …n laid to rest when it was further …nt that Saudi Arabia was interested …buying Leopard tanks.

Unwittingly the political year in Bonn …egun with an explosive debate on …s exports.

…leven *years* ago the Bonn coalition …Social and Free Democrats assumed …e with the laudable intention of li…ing exports of war weapons and …ipment.

Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt, …o was disgusted by the arms trade as …iously *practised, with all it entailed,* …ed for abstinence:

"The Federal government is not inte…ed in private arms deals or private …s exports."

In June 1971 the Federal government … down political guidelines for arms …ports that were based on two 1961 …s, the Arms Control Act and the …eign Trade Act.

Their gist was that exporting arms to …o countries was permitted, exporting …s to international hot spots (as …ined by the Bonn Foreign Office) …s prohibited and exports to other …n-communist countries were to be al…wed in certain circumstances.

The relevant passage for this third ca…gory reads: "no weapons of war, unless …neral exceptions have been laid down … specific exceptions are made in indi…dual instances in view of special con…derations."

In several defence policy white papers …e government's resolve to limit the …ms trade was reaffirmed.

Yet the facts of the matter tell a dif…ent tale. Between 1969 and 1979 the …ederal Republic exported war materiel …orth DM6.71bn, not including licence …es, parts, blueprints and manufacturing …ant.

Arms ties were *established* with 71 …eveloping countries, the interpretation … what constituted a hot spot grew in…easingly generous and the practice of …lowing exceptions became increasingly …idespread.

Exceptions gradually became the rule, with annual exports of arms and military equipment averaging DM1bn and in 1977 exceeding DM2bn for the first time.

No-one knows the exact amount, pa*rtly because the Federal Statistics Office* is not allowed to publish them, partly because no-one is altogether sure any longer what is going on in the small print of export contracts.

This lack of clarity lays Germany wide open to ridicule, since Bonn has always been adamant at the UN on the need for industrialised countries to own up to their arms trade.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher last called for the establishment of a registry office to which industrialised countries were to submit details of their arms exports a mere four months ago.

Yet as matters stand not even members of the Bonn Bundestag are briefed *on what is envisaged as being registered* with the UN.

Publication of the true figures would in all probability reveal that Germany is by no means a major league offender. In 1977 it accounted for a mere two per cent of the international arms trade tur*nover, which totalled DM100bn.*

The United States, for instance, accounted for 46, the Soviet Union for 30, France for 10 and Britain for eight per cent.

In Germany the arms trade accounts for less than half a per cent of exports *as a whole, whereas in America the per*centage is roughly 20 and in Britain and France 10 each.

Arms output accounts for well under two per cent of GNP, while only three hundredths of a per cent of GNP are arms exports to Third World countries.

The payroll of the arms industry totals between 200,000 and 300,000 (depending which figures are to be believed), of whom about 36,000 depend on arms exports for their livelihood.

That is hardly an inordinate number out of a countrywide total of 22 million people in gainful employment.

So there can be no doubt that there are worse offenders than the West Germans. But there can also be no gainsay*ing that we never really wanted the* figures to be so high.

The growth rates in particular are *alarming. Do we really want to carry on* in this way? Should we do so?

It is a question that has been hotly debated in the past — during the 1974/75 recession. Many then favoured derestricting the arms trade, stepping it up, even.

The main aim was to safeguard jobs, so much so that at times it sounded as though the job justified the means. Similar views are widespread now another recession is in the offing.

Two submarines for Pinochet provide 1,000 shipyard workers with employment, while 800 Leopard 2 tanks will keep 2,000 people in employment for eight years.

*The works councils of arms manufac*turing companies, keen to ensure job continuity, are anxious to see the export trade flourish.

Their logic is similar to that of workers in cigarette factories who regard the statutory warning that smoking may *cause cancer as a threat to their jobs.*

For the past two years Germany has also run up a current account deficit, DM10bn in 1979 and DM28bn in 1980, thereby adding attraction to what its opponents call the death trade.

Let us disregard moral arguments. *There are enough reasons of a more* down-to-earth kind why arms exports should not be derestricted.

First, the effect would be limited in respect of job creation. The most that could be expected would be slightly less fluctuation in capacity utilisation.

Besides, once production capacity has been established it has to be kept busy. One then no longer has friends or foes, *merely good customers and poor customers.*

Second, many arms are indeed exported to the hot spots where there have been the most clashes, wars, coups and unrest over the past 30 years: the unstable Third World.

In the mid-60s they accounted for 35 per cent of arms imports; they now account for nearly 75 per cent. So we are pouring powder into kegs to which the fuses have already been lit.

Third, Willy Brandt complained in his North-South commission's report that it was the poorer developing countries that were spending more and more heavily on arms imports.

It was money they could ill afford to spare from their peaceful development programmes — either that or money they did not have in the first place.


In *1978* the Chancellor told the UN General Assembly that "the settlement of international arms transfer must hold an important place in our endeavours to bring about arms limitation."

Foreign Minister Genscher sounded a similar note in 1980, saying: "We cannot afford to look on idly while arms are pumped into developing countries that need not guns but schools and hospitals, tractors and lathes."

In point of fact we are not looking on idly; we are in there pumping away with the others. The price of the two subma*rines sold to Colombia, for instance,* is almost exactly the amount supplied to that country in development aid.

Arms purchases by the Third World amount to almost exactly two thirds of

Continued on page 9



West Berlin Mayor quits

The *Governing Mayor of West Berlin, Dietrich Stobbe, announces his resignation to* the city's Senate after his nominations for Cabinet had failed to win approval. See page 3.

(Photo: Sven Simon)

IN THIS ISSUE

■ DEFENCE

Crossroads for military decision makers

The author, Lt. Gen. Lothar Domröse, 60, is the deputy chief of military planning and operations at Nato's SHAPE.

Bonn's Defence Ministry, the government as a whole and the Bundestag are faced with major security and defence policy decisions.

This applies equally to the volume of the defence budget and the necessary cooperation in Nato over the German security contribution within and outside Nato areas. Division of labour is clearly the operative word.

Decisions will also have to be made on such specific issues as the priorities that have to be assigned in view of the relatively small budget.

These will include such projects as the Leopard II tank, Roland and Nike and their successors, TNF and land-based naval warfare weapons.

The timing for the purchase of these weapons systems must be determined as must the consequences arising from treaties and commitments on a national and international plane.

Other purchases will involve ammunition for existing and future weapons systems, for training purposes and as a stockpile in case of war as well the construction of new ammunition dumps and the restructuring of old ones.

Money will have to be set aside for research and development that will have a bearing on Germany's military contribution in the future. The effects of this on industry and its consequences for the promotion of new blood in science and research will have to be determined.

These are only a few examples. There are many more things to be decided after the February/March stocktaking by the Defence Minister.

Predictably, this stocktaking and the decisions regarding armament projects will kindle the public discussion over the "right" strategy. The question as to the worth of Nato's flexible response strategy will be raised again.

This is to be welcomed because only a broad consensus on the strategy can;

- provide the necessary defence funds;
- set the correct priorities for the armed forces; and
- determine the best structure within the framework of the Federal Republic of Germany's contribution to the defence effort.

As to the strategy: Nato's flexible response strategy, which has been in effect for a decade, is the most adequate strategy for the moment and the foreseeable future. It will remain in effect until a technological breakthrough comparable to the development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles leads to a fundamental change in the arsenal.

The flexible response strategy is essentially aimed at preventing war. It acts as a deterrent while permitting warfare with the necessary means should this deterrent fail.

It is necessary to point out in this connection that all considerations such as area defence or area saturation defence can lay no claim to being strategies. At best, they can be viewed as defence concepts or methods of operation.

The first Bundeswehr inspector general, Gen. Heusinger, said in 1966 at Heidelberg University: "I believe that the term 'strategy' should be understood as the combination of all considerations and means in all areas, in peace and in war, and as planning directed at a specific strategic aim. Today, this strategic aim is by no means war but the problem of preserving peace."

This view is as valid today as it was then.

The war prevention aim calls for the provision by the United States of adequate strategic nuclear weapons and an adequate nuclear force in Europe with limited support by the European Nato partners.

The necessary decisions for these two of the three pillars of flexible response have been made.

But what about Nato's conventional forces, the third pillar?

For more than a decade (or, to be exact, since the flexible response strategy came into effect) many white papers, Nato communiqués and declarations by Cabinet members have stressed the supremacy over Nato of Warsaw Pact land and air forces — especially in central Europe.

This makes it the more surprising that the Alliance's counter measures to do have with this possibly deadly weakness have remained inadequate.

For some years, we have had a Nato concept that has generally been accepted as correct and that provides for reinforcement in case of tension of Europe's air and land forces from the United States, Canada and Britain.

Manoeuvres held in Germany in the past few years and involving such reinforcements have been convincing.

Many of us know of the progress made in an area that goes under the general heading "host nation support" for these reinforcements in Norway, Denmark, the Benelux countries and Germany. And many know about the expense of infrastructure projects.

Many also know that every US division or brigade of these reinforcement troops must be doubly equipped with weapons and material: in the United States and in Europe.

This is a costly but indispensable concept if central Europe is not to be turned into a permanent army camp in peacetime.

Notwithstanding such preparations, it takes time to transport these large units from overseas areas to this country or, where Canadian forces are concerned, to Norway. Will we always have that time?

A brigade, for instance, consists of several thousand men and several hundred armoured vehicles of various kinds. These are weapons systems that are bulky and difficult to transport.

This has led to the demand for special transport facilities and, above all, for the breathing necessary to deliver these units to another continent in good time. This applies to both the Nato territory proper and to areas outside Europe, such as the Gulf region, where one or several members of the Alliance have vital interests.

There is yet another problem that arises, for the future: will we continue to have sufficient US army units to make available to Europe under the reinforcement concept?

I have deliberately mentioned only large army units, omitting air force and navy units because different conditions apply to them.

The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops and the war between Iraq and Iran have brought it home to the German public that not all of our national security interests and those of most other Nato members can be safeguarded by the alliance only and by the commitments under the terms of this alliance.

This has of necessity given rise to the question as to how and by whom these interests are to be protected.

There has been talk of expanding the Nato treaty or at least enlarging the area covered by it. But policy makers were quick to reject this idea which now no longer plays a major role in public discussion.

But the Afghanistan invasion has highlighted the importance of maintaining a balance of military power.

It has also brought it home to many how limited the military means are which the Nato partners need to safeguard the interests outside the treaty area of individual, several or all members of the Alliance.

No matter how convincing white papers might be on the ratio of conventional Nato and Warsaw Pact forces, the actual use of military means is always more poignant and alarming. There can be no argument against this.

So far as the future is concerned, the following must be noted:

- It remains an unchanged fact that forward defence is indispensable to the Federal Republic of Germany;
- A "minimum" in terms of divisions and/or brigades is essential for such a defence;
- An MBFR agreement would stipulate a maximum presence in peacetime;
- There would be fewer reinforcement troops from overseas available for the *defence of central Europe* if these troops are needed outside the Nato area, as for instance in the Gulf region.

The conclusion from the last point must therefore be that the last point must therefore be that the European partners in the Alliance must make provisions to offset the shortfall of US forces if our war prevention efforts are to remain credible.

Soon after the invasion of Afghanistan, political considerations and the limited availability of suitable forces led to the proposal of a division of labour among the members of the alliance.

Bonn Defence Minister Hans Apel explained this at a Munich military affairs conference last February and said that such a division of labour would have to encompass political, economic and military areas.

One aspect is the division of labour among the alliance's land forces.

I assume that the United States would in any event make such forces available for deployment outside the Nato area; in other words, in areas where vital interests of one or several partners must be defended.

As a result, these land forces would be unavailable for the common defence of Europe and thus of our own country. They must therefore be replaced by other troops.

One solution for this country would to establish reserve brigades that could be mobilised at short notice. They would be part of the field army and would be subject to Nato command.

Their equipment, armament, structure and training would have to correspond to the active brigades because they would have to carry out the same missions under the same conditions.

So far, no US land forces stationed in

General Lothar Domröse
(Photo: ...)

Europe have been earmarked for deployment outside the Nato area.

The deterrent principle calls for continuous presence of these forces in Europe.

To preserve the peace it is also essential that US land forces be available at all times for deployment to Europe in case of a crisis or war. This must remain unchanged.

If, however, we have to assume in the future that some of the reinforcement troops are earmarked for deployment outside Europe, we must, as I said before, make up for the shortfall.

This cannot mean the mobilisation of large units that would not become available until many days after the outbreak of war.

What matters so far as Germany is concerned is to have units that can be mobilised and deployed quickly to reinforce the field troops during the tension period rather than after the outbreak of war.

A regional balance of forces will remain indispensable as an instrument of securing peace in the future as well. This calls for adequate armament on the one hand and verifiable arms limitation on the other.

It is in our own interests that the Vienna MBFR talks lead to a satisfactory arrangement for both parties.

Every German defence contribution and every change regarding the German element must therefore conform to MBFR arrangements.

The army model 4 is particularly suitable for the establishment and training of reserve brigades provided the battalions of combat troops have four companies as their basic structure for times of war and peace and provided the army is restructured accordingly.

My suggestion in this respect is as follows: training throughout the 15 months of national service must take place in the same unit and under the same company commander from the first day to the last.

What differentiates this type of training from all others is obvious to every experienced military leader. It is the unity, the undivided responsibility for training from the very beginning to the point of making a soldier ready for combat.

It is also the cohesion and closeness of a fighting unit as well as practical comradeship. This is the only way of turning a haphazard assembly of soldiers into a unit.

This method leads to a high standard of training and a high degree of presence for field troop units. Moreover, only this type of training can largely eliminate the need to "retrain" reservists, thus reducing cost.

Such a training course is feasible only

Continued on page 5

Continued from page 4

in conjunction with the establishment of reserve brigades that are structured and equipped in exactly the same way as are active brigades.

Only such a training makes it possible to bring young people to such a degree of closeness that they feel personally responsible for each other along with feeling responsible for the defence of the country. This closeness is of necessity lacking in most of today's reserve units.

After the 15-month basic national service, the fully trained soldier is then put on Standby Grade I for 12 months.

As a reservist, he now covers the period of time it takes for his unit to train recruits. His status makes him available at short notice even without mobilisation.

Once the 12 months are over, the trooper goes on Standby Grade II for 15 months and so — together with his comrades-in-arms — forms the reserve unit of a reserve brigade of the same type.

Assuming that three US divisions totalling nine brigades become unavailable as reinforcement troops for the defence of Europe and hence this country because they are on standby as a Rapid Deployment Force to protect vital interests in the Gulf region (and this would include German interests), I consider the establishment of six German reserve brigades an adequate defence contribution.

Such a concept would be the most cost effective contribution the army — and hence the Bundeswehr as a whole — could make in terms of the division of labour idea.

This contribution in the form of six reserve brigades would greatly help to preserve the credibility of the flexible response strategy by providing the necessary conventional component of forward defence in central Europe — especially for the defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The present restructuring of the army to conform to model 4 is the right moment for the establishment of these reserve brigades.

A decision now would also demonstrate to the Warsaw Pact that we are determined to defend our country and will have an impact on the MBFR talks that have been marking time for years.

(Die Welt, 14 January 1981)

■ STATE SECURITY

'Dens of conspiracy' play big role in terror hunt

Security forces have arrested 340 persons on suspicion of terrorist activities in the past four years — that is, since 1977 when the three most notorious attacks took place: the assassinations of Chief Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback, the banker Jürgen Ponto and industrialist Hanns Martin Schleyer.

In the cases of Buback and Schleyer, several of the people accompanying them were also killed.

Most of those arrested have been released; 29 are still in custody, including Knut Folkerts, Angelika Speitel, Günther Sonnenberg, and the two who were arrested in Zagreb, Yugoslavia, in May 1978.

The Yugoslav authorities released them after an unsuccessful bid to swap them for Croatians in this country. But they were later seized by German security officers. They are Wagner and Sieglinde Hofmann. Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Peter Boock, who were among those arrested and released by the Yugoslavs, are still at large.

Five alleged terrorists have been killed during attempted arrest or as the result of an accident.

Willy-Peter Stoll and Michael Knoll were killed in the Rhine-Ruhr area while resisting arrest in 1978. The same happened to Elisabeth van Dyck in May 1979. On 25 July 1980, Juliana Plambeck and Wolfgang Beer were killed in a road accident when their car was involved in a *head-on* crash with a lorry.

Six alleged terrorists, among them Astrid Proll, turned themselves in. Here, the courts will have to determine whether they have actually turned their backs on terrorism, which could be taken as mitigating circumstances. This is an important point in criminal law and will have a considerable bearing on the cases.

Arrest warrants have been issued for 33 suspects.

Forty were involved in the 1977 terrorist crimes. This figure can be fixed primarily due to the investigative work of the federal Criminal Investigation Department. Apart from the assassinations, these crimes also include the rocket attack on the building that houses the federal prosecutor's office and the kidnaping of Austrian industrialist Palmers which obviously served to replenish the war chest.

Since 29 persons are in custody, two were already in custody, five were killed and six turned themselves in (a total of 42) the obvious conclusion is that the hard core of terrorist scene has been endangered.

According to security sources, 13 of the 40 terrorists involved in the 1977 attacks are still at large.

Among those for whom arrest warrants have been issued are Christian Klar and Adelheid Schulz.

They were kept under observation by the Hamburg security forces in March 1980. It was at that time that undercover agents managed to take new photographs of them which now appear in the new wanted poster that encompasses 15 names.

The police have so far failed to arrest Klar and Schulz — a fact which played an important role in last year's election campaign.

It is still unclear why no arrests were made despite a decision to that effect by the conference of ministers of the interior (federal and states).

It appears that this was largely due to the idea that "sources" had to be protected.

On the other hand, it appears that Klar and Schulz had a tail on them during their extensive travels within this country and in a Frankfurt student's home. An arrest should therefore not have been too difficult.

Politicians now maintain that arresting them would have interfered with the prevention of another planned terrorist attack. But it is not easy to understand (though theoretically possible) that an arrest would have precipitated such an attack.

So far, it has generally been assumed that it was the police successes that have greatly contributed to the relatively peace on the terrorist front since 1977.

There are a number of rumours in circulation regarding the further course of police action against Klar and Schulz.

According to one version, the police are still in a position to arrest them at any time; another has it that the two have disappeared.

It is considered almost certain that the failure to arrest them and the delay in informing the chief public prosecutor and the federal CID have greatly contributed to a certain mood of dissatisfaction.

Most of the arrests were made abroad, and in many cases they were made possible by information provided by the federal CID.

Konspirativen Wohnungen ("dens of conspiracy" or hideouts) have played a major role in tracking down terrorists. They serve as both havens and planning centres for operations.

About 45 of these hideouts have been discovered since 1977.

Among the favourite regions are the Rhine-Ruhr and the Rhine-Main conurbation (which extends all the way to Heidelberg, Mannheim and, in one case, to Karlsruhe).

One hideout was found in Nuremberg. In northern Germany Hanover and Göttingen are favoured. This could have some significance if seen in context of the recent riots in the old university town.

Two hideouts were found in Berlin, and Hamburg also plays a role.

Abroad, it is primarily Paris, Vienna, Milan, Luxembourg and Holland where such places were found.

The use of computers and special methods developed by the federal CID have played a major role in finding hideouts.

This involves the sorting of specific characteristics. For instance the way in which bills for utilities are paid. But it is a method which has come under attack by the Authority for the Protection Against Data Abuse because it entails the screening of large quantities of material to establish individual peculiarities. Usually there are simple, innocent explanations.

Fingerprints and handwriting specimens show that Klar and Schulz used many hideouts, including ones in Heidelberg, Paris and Hamburg.

Their fingerprints were also found on the car in which Juliane Plambeck and Wolfgang Beer crashed — a clear indication that close contacts are being maintained within the widening terrorist setup.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 6 January 1981)

Boge tipped as CID chief

Heinrich Boge, since October 1978 a senior official at the Bonn Interior Ministry where he is in charge of police matters, is tipped to succeed Horst Herold at the helm of the Federal Criminal Investigation Department.

Until October 1980, Herr Boge steadfastly refused to sever ties with Hanover where his family lived and where he spent as much time as his Bonn post would permit.

Born in Osnabrück in March 1929, Boge is not only a graduate lawyer but also a police officer who has thoroughly learned his trade.

After graduating from secondary school in 1948, he first apprenticed himself as a bricklayer because Lower Saxony's police had put a ban on new hiring.

He then intended to study architecture. But he changed his mind a year later, applied for a police job and was hired.

Only two years after joining the police he became an assistant instructor at the academy.

In 1953, he enrolled at Göttingen University to study law.

In 1957, he attended a training course for inspectors at the Hiltrup Police Academy. Herr Boge held the rank of *Oberkommissar* when he graduated from law school and again went to the police academy — this time as its deputy head.


He then worked at the Lower Saxony Interior Ministry where he was in charge of police affairs and organisational matters.

In October 1969, Boge was appointed head of the Hanover Police.

After the 1978 state election in which the CDU captured the absolute majority, Boge (SPD) came politically under fire because his officers had had to retreat before a handful of radical demonstrators.

The criticism was directed specifically against his "long leash" policy.

Though he appears tough, Boge had enough sensitivity to draw his conclu-



Heinrich Boge
(Photo: Karin Blüher)

sions from the criticism and accept the position offered him at the Interior Ministry in Bonn.

Hanover's police force lost a capable administrator and a chief of police who was extremely popular with his officers.

Both tough and conciliatory, Boge has a matter-of-fact approach which is marked by detachment.


He has always been a proponent of teamwork, notwithstanding the fact that he believes that somebody must have the ultimate say.

Relations between Boge and Herold (who is still in office) are said to be strained.

Herold says that Boge lacks the necessary experience in fighting terrorism, though he does not doubt that his quick grasp would enable him to catch up soon.

Hubert Böllert

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 15 January 1981)



ENERGY


Seeking to keep the supply lines open

This is the year when Iranian gas should have started flowing into Germany. But the project has been thwarted by the 1978 Islamic revolution.

The way things stand, there is little likelihood that conditions in Iran will improve and that the gas contract in which Iran has already invested more than one billion dollars (a contract which has never been officially abrogated) will be fulfilled.

It is obvious that Europe's gas importers, who had hoped that the Iranian deal would ease the energy situation, now have to look for another supplier.

The Soviet Union, which already supplies Western Europe and which was a party to the deal with Iran, would seem the obvious choice.



That country could jump into the breach relatively quickly and begin supplying gas as early as 1984/85. But the contract for 40 billion cubic metres of Russian natural gas to be supplied to Germany, France, Belgium and Holland is not yet signed.

There are a number of considerations that have delayed the signing. The high price demanded by the Soviet Union (which is higher than the international price level) is not the main obstacle because this could simply be viewed as a card in the poker game over the terms and conditions.


More important is the financing of the deal and the fact that Germany would become dependent on a country with a different economic and social system — a system which occasionally displays considerable aggression towards the West.

It is certainly not the function of energy companies to make economic policy — that is for Bonn's politicians.

But the question is whether entrepreneurs should completely disregard political considerations even though politicians take the pros and cons of such a deal rather lightly — like the chairman of the Economic Policy Work Group of the SPD Parliamentary Party who argues that the fact that the Soviet Union is prepared to supply even more gas is in fact a guarantee that it won't turn off the tap.

One could just as well argue that appointing a bull to guard a china shop is a guarantee that nothing will be broken.

What speaks in favour of the deal is the fact that the Iranian gas would in any event have been piped to Europe via the Soviet Union.



Under the Iran contract, the gas was to have been piped to the Donez industrial region in the Soviet Union. Russia would have supplied Europe with the same quantity of gas from Western Siberia.

In this way, Iran would have been a major element in securing Western Europe's gas supplies, meaning that it could have turned off the tap for the Soviet Union — especially if, once Russian gas stopped flowing, Europe responded by discontinuing payments to Iran.

It is also worth pointing out that at the last Hanover Fair, a Soviet cabinet member openly threatened that his country would turn off the gas tap if Bonn "misbehaved". He did not say what Moscow understood under "not misbehaving".

This sort of thing did not recur but it clearly shows that Moscow is not beyond considering such a move.

If the new gas-pipes financing deal with Moscow were to come to fruition, this country's maximum dependence on soviet gas would be 30 per cent of requirements. And it is certainly correct to assume that the Soviet gas would thus account for about 6 per cent of our total energy needs.

There is little consolation in the fact that Moscow has never yet made use of the energy weapon because, should this contingency arise, our entire energy policy would collapse. The shortfall could only be offset by importing more oil, and this would run counter to the prime objective of reducing the dependence on oil.

The gas importers keep stressing that we must not swap one dependence for another. Diversification of suppliers, they say, is a must.

But simply having a mass of contracts with politically unrealiable parties would hardly help to achieve this aim.

Moreover, experts doubt that the estimated overall gas consumption of 90 billion cubic metres in 1990, on which the proportion of Russian gas is based, is realistic.

According to latst consumption trends, the figure is more likely to be 70 billion cubic metres.

If (due to the rigid terms of the deal necessitated by the financing and the supply of pipes) the Russian quota remains unchanged, the proportion of Soviet gas will be as high as 40 per cent. This figure gives rise to great concern.

Another drawback of the deal is the financing. Even disregarding the fact that Germany would import only 30 per cent of the annual 40 billion cubic metres involved while bearing half the exploration and exploitation costs for the gasfields (and is also expected to put DM20bn into the pipeline construction) there is the fact that the entire East Bloc is deeply in debt to the West. So the gas buyer, Germany, would thus become doubly dependent: both for its energy supply and the security of its financial investement.

The gas importers have always insisted that the supplier countries invest their own money as well whenever such international deals were made.

In the case of Algeria a major contract foundered on that country's refusal to honour its original commitment to build a liquefaction plant costing around DM2bn. The plant would have been indispensable to the deal.

So far, the motto has been: gas — but not at any price. This tenet should be applied to the Soviet Union as well.

There are other regions such as the North Sea, Nigeria or Canada that could act as suppliers. They might not b[e as] convenient as Russa, which is a [...] and proved supplier, but they [...] serve better than the Soviets wh[en it] comes to implementing the idea [of not] putting all our energy eggs in the [same] basket. Even the Opec countries [...] be considered as possible suppliers.

Though there are uncertainty [...] there too, those countries do not [...] their economic decisions determine[d by] political considerations — at least [not to] the same extent as in the Soviet U[nion] where politics has always had p[...] over economic considerations.

Wolfgang Müller-Haeseler

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei[tung] für Deutschland, 10 January 1[981])

EEC reliance on energy imp[orts]
Imported energy as a percentage of 1979 consumption
Denmark 98,1 — Luxembourg 99,2 — [...] 93,7 — Italy 83,4 — France 81,2 — Britain 16,7 — Holland 7,8 — Fed. Rep. of Ge[rmany] 60,4

Reducing dependence on oil remains a priority

The latest petrol price increase, which has taken the price of normal gas from about DM1.20 to DM1.24 (it varies slightly) means that the DM1.50 litre is likely to be reached this year.

In April, petrol tax is to go up by another 7 pfennigs a litre.

Most of the blame for the present rise is being put on the oil companies, who always seem to be the lightning rods in this situation.

But critics should remember that petrol prices are rising world-wide.

They should realise that the main culprit is Opec — a viewpoint that is not particularly popular in this country.

Germany's most pressing energy problem is to rid itself of its excessive dependence on oil, although this has somewhat diminished.

Energy consumption in the Federal Republic of Germany
in million tonnes of coal equivalent
1975 348 — 1976 370 — 1977 372 — 1978 389 — 1979 408 — 1980 391 (est.)
Where it comes from
1980 percentages
Oil 47,8 — Coal 19,7 — Natural gas 16,5 — Brown coal 9,9 — Nuclear power 3,6 — Hydro elect. etc. 2,5
Source: Arge Energiebilanzen

Even the first energy programm[e of] the early 1970s was aimed at [getting] away from oil and has helped maint[ain] our coal capacity through high subsi[dies].

Getting away from oil is even m[ore] important now in view of the strai[n oil] imports have imposed on our balanc[e of] payments.

Last year, the oil bill amounted [to] some DM70bn compared with DM1[...] ten years ago. The current account [defi]cit thus caused will amount to a[bout] DM30bn for 1980 — a situation [that] must be remedied.

To make matters worse, unemp[loy]ment will be one of our most pres[sing] economic problems this year and [the] economy will need new impulses.

This being so, it is surprising that [the] proposal to step up the construction [of] nuclear power stations has met with [...] little public sympathy.

It is neither possible nor desirable [to] build new A-plants overnight. But if [at] least a goodly portion of the DM40bn [...] DM50bn worth of cancelled or plan[ned] A-plants were to be tackled in the ne[xt] couple of years, several things could [be] achieved:

- The economy would receive ne[w] impulses without another costly boo[st] programme of questionalbe worth;
- Unemployment would be reduc[ed] markedly; and
- We would save a great deal of fo[r]eign exchange in the medium and lo[ng] terms.

Politicians should not be discoura[ged] by the fact that the same quarters th[at] now level their accusations at the "ga[ng] of price hikers" are also most vocifer[ous] in opposing the construction of furthe[r] A-plants.

The time has come to show colou[rs] — and it need not necessarily be red o[r] green.

Heiner Radzio

(Handelsblatt, 12 January 198[1])

[T]RADE

Third World anger at protectionism of Europe's textile industry

[M]ost of the 2.5 million workers in the European Community's 26,000 [textile] and clothing factories stopped for an hour late last year to remind [the E]EC Commission of its duty.

[Brus]sels Eurocrats made no bones [about] the fact that this brief industrial [action] was welcome.

[Th]e reason: The European authority [in char]ge of foreign trade is faced with [negot]iations with some 30 Third World [and] East Bloc countries in a bid to pre[vent] them from swamping Europe with [...] blouses, shirts, trousers, pullovers, [...], fibres and fabrics.

[Th]e skirmishes at the negotiating [table] are due to the fact that the second [Wor]ld Textile Agreement is due to ex[pire] at the end of this year.

[Th]e agreement was concluded in 1977 [betw]een the EEC Commission and [Thir]d World and East Bloc countries [and] is unique inasmuch as it imposes [...] restrictions on Asian, North Afri[can,] Latin American and East European [manu]facturers.

[If] no new agreement were to be con[clud]ed our textiles and clothing industry [wou]ld have to fear that the European [mar]ket would again be flooded with [chea]p products from Hong Kong, South [Ko]rea, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Hun[gary] and others as was the case in the [...]1960s when these countries' exports [to E]urope *notched* up annual growth [rates] *of 22 per cent.*

[Thou]gh the warning strike was some[what] premature because the hot phase [of] the talks will not come until the aut[umn], it was nevertheless welcome to [the] Brussels Eurocrats because it shored [up] their position.

[T]hird World exporters have already [ma]de it clear that they will not go along [wi]th new self-restriction agreements — [the]y feel cheated. And who is to blame [the]m?

Three years ago the Commission's [...]er negotiators, headed by Tran van [Thi]nh — a Vietnamese with French citi[zen]ship — were so successful that those [cou]ntries' annual growth rates for ex[por]ts to the EEC (in terms of quantity) [dw]indled to 1.9 per cent for cotton, [ma]n-made fibres, T-shirts, pullovers, [tro]users, blouses and shirts; to 4.2 per [cent] for stockings, socks, underwear, [...]coats, jackets, handkerchiefs, bed [line]n and bras; and to 11.8 per cent for [oth]er textiles.

The products in the first group ac[cou]nted for 56 per cent of their overall [ex]ports to the Community. In 1979, US [ex]ports of clothing and textiles to West[ern] Europe rose by a whacking 66 per [ce]nt.

It is understandable that Third World [ex]porters were enraged when confronted [wi]th these figures at their meeting in [Bo]gota, Colombia.

The developing world has for many [yea]rs demanded that the West virtually [han]d over its textile and clothing indus[try] to them as part of the New Interna[tion]al Economic Order, arguing that the [We]st should instead devote itself to [hi]gh technology.

The European Community is now [do]ing exactly the opposite in the form [of] a World Textile Agreement to protect [the] rich capitalist nations at the expense [of] the poor.



Europe's textiles manufacturers are convinced that the Council of Ministers will ereot trade barriers if Third World exporters refuse to go along with self-restrictions.

But this is far from certain. Though the World Textile Agreement is the most extreme exception to Gatt's free trade rules, even the textiles market needs a certain degree of consensus. Should the Community arbitrarily restrict imports, the free trade regulations of Gatt would be brought to bear in retaliation.

The British, who burned their fingers in the case of Indonesia, are a telling example.

Indonesia is one of the countries with which the EEC has agreed on protective clauses only. In other words the Community does not restrict imports *a priori* but only if one of the member nations applies for restrictions — and even then only once imports exceed a certain predetermined level.

Last summer, Britain applied to the Commission to stop the import of 100,000 pairs of trousers from Indonesia worth about 1.5 million pounds. Indonesia responded instantly by cancelling industrial orders worth 15 times as much. In doing so it acted entirely in keeping with Gatt provisions.

Even so, consumers should not be left in the illusion that they will again be able to buy chic and cheap clothing made in the Philippines or Bangladesh.

The Commission and the Council of Ministers are bound to declare these countries undesirable participants in the market.

Even Bonn's liberally minded Economic affairs minister, Count Lambsdorff, would like to restrict imports more than hitherto — at least from not so poor countries like Hong Kong, South Korea, India and Brazil which previously provided 50 per cent of the Community's total imports from the Third World.

The two major arguments of Europe's protectionists are that they do not want to prevent the poorest nations from exporting. Instead, this is to apply to the socalled threshold countries which are already semi-industrialised.

The other argument is that the World Textile Agreement does not curb those countries' exports but only the export growth rates which are higher than the growth rates of domestic production in Europe.

Gatt specifically stipulates that exports must not be reduced by agreement. It thus moderates the protectionism of the World Textile Agreement.

It is therefore not surprising that dyed-in-the-wool protectionists are dissatisfied because the second agreement with its export restrictions has showed little in the way of results.

Europe's textiles and clothing industry continues to shrink in varying degrees from country to country.

After 1977, when Tran van Thinh, as he put it "closed the European boutique" there was no new trend in the development of Europe's industry.

In Germany, the number of textile workers diminished by 22 per cent to 617,000 between 1973 and 1976. Thereafter, it shrank by only 8 per cent because Germany had completed its restructuring and modernisation phase.

Britain's textiles and clothing industry in the past 12 months has reduced its payroll by more than 10 per cent by laying off 80,000 people.

The culprit was not cheap imports from the Third World but those from Italy.

Protected from even cheaper Far East imports, the Italians were well prepared for Common Market competition and so dealt severe blows, especially to Britain and France. It was these countries that were the most emphatic proponents of the World Textile Agreement.

Winfried Münster

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 3 January 1981)

Germany a chief target for steel exports

Last autumn, Italy drafted its very own strategy to curb steel imports. Pointing to the EEC Commission's crisis provisions, Rome made use of a simple but effective instrument: 24 of the country's 36 customs posts were stripped of their authority to process steel shipments.

This type of indirect trade restriction would be unthinkable in the Federal Republic of Germany.

This is one of the reasons why steel imports to the EEC have been concentrated on Germany.

In 1974, only one-third of EEC steel imports came to Germany. Last year, it was two-fifths.

At present, non-EEC nations supply 10 per cent of our steel market, which means that their market share has doubled since 1973.

The most important suppliers are Spain, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.

The past 20 years have been marked by rapid development — and not only in technical terms — of the iron and steel industry. New producers mushroomed in many parts of the world.

The Essen-based Rhineland-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research has established that 90 countries now produce iron and Steel. 20 years ago, they numbered 36.

The traditional supremacy of Europe and the United States on the world steel market has become somewhat shaky. They have lost markets and new import quotas have reduced prices and the volume of sales. Japan was for a long time a formidable competitor. Its crude steel production rose between 1965 and 1979 from 65 million to a huge 116 million tons a year.

But the Japanese have now become somewhat restrained on the international steel market. The trend in Japan is now more towards processing the metal at home. The idea is to export finished and hence more expensive products rather than crude steel.

Crude steel capacities have also increased considerably in Latin America, tripling in the past 15 years to hit the 35 million tons a year mark.

The growth rates have been most pronounced in Brazil and Mexico.

Brazil's capacity now stands at 12 million tons a year.

In the Far East, it was primarily Taiwan and South Korea that developed their capacities. They rose from 3 million tons a year in 1974 to 9 million in 1978.

The main reason for the growing steel output in the threshold countries was their own economic growth in conjunction with rising demand worldwide.

Some countries have also been motivated by strategic interests and prestige considerations.

According to the International Iron and Steel Institute, Third World steel output rose from an annual 31 million tons in 1974 to 55 million in 1979. The industrial nations' production dropped five per cent during the same period.

It should, however, be mentioned that the crude steel production in the Federal Republic of Germany alone amounts to about 40 million tons a year, which puts the figures for the Third World into perspective.

Another reason for the development of the steel industry outside the traditional steel producing areas lies in the technical developments of the past couple of decades.

These now permit even smaller steel mills to operate profitably.

The commercial feasibility now lies at as little as 10,000 tons a year. As a result, such mini steel mills are sprouting everywhere.

New production methods have provided countries with natural gas resources with a new opportunity.

In fact, major German steel companies are already contemplating importing not only ore from the developing countries but iron as well. The idea is to process it here and use it to make special steel. The new steel producing nations lack the know-how to do so themselves.

So far, the new steel producing nations have not caused too much of a stir in Europe. Of the 700 million tons of steel produced worldwide in 1979, only one-seventh reached world markets while the rest was sold domestically.

And of the 110 million tons traded on international markets, only an estimated 7 per cent came from the Third World.

Japan and Europe accounted for 60 per cent.


Says Dr. Ruprecht Vondran of the Iron and Steel Association: "Third World production and its effects on the traditional suppliers of iron and steel are overestimated."

He points to the fact that those countries need so much steel that their imports have risen.

The threat to European steel producers comes from another quarter: the East Bloc, where the steel industry enjoys a privileged position. Those countries want to step up exports to improve their foreign exchange earnings.

Leonhard Spielhofer

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 6 January 1981)



THE ENVIRONMENT

Problems of the urban ecosystem

Frankfurter Rundschau

agine the unkempt central reservation of an urban highway, delegates to Second European Ecological Symposium in West Berlin were told.

It is soon overgrown with weeds such dandelion, lamb's tail plantain, clover, ious kinds of grass and fern.

One day workmen come round and ugh the vegetation under prior to the tire length of the centre section being eded and laid out with uniform grass.

From the viewpoint of the urban ecogist this labour- and cost-intensive bid make nature more orderly is more an merely superfluous.

One of the ecologists' foremost mands is for leeway to be left for pontaneous vegetation, especially in wns, and for the fauna that accompany

The city and nature, the gathering eed, are not mutually exclusive.

Spontaneous vegetation, for instance, much better than "managed" urban eenery at upholding the natural funcon of the soil as an environment for ganisms and root space for plants.

It ensures a variety of species that is sirable not only from the viewpoint of ture conservation; it is also of special portance in restoring the quality of ound water.

Soil criss-crossed by plenty of roots d a home for large numbers of orms and micro-organisms is more easily permeated by rainwater and is a ore effective filter, said Professor anfred Horbert of Berlin Technical University's department of ecology.

One of the most frequently discussed ban ecology problems is the damage used to roadside trees by salt spread on winter roads to melt snow and ice.

A comprehensive survey of soil properties could provide an effective answer. Damage is unlikely to occur where oil is so quick to filter off the salt ater as it thaws that it has passed hrough the root stratum by the time vegetation begins to grow again.

In areas where water does not seep through the soil so readily the planners must take their choice. They must either dispense with salt or forgo deep-rooted trees.

Professor Bradshaw of Liverpool University, a British ecologist, described the urban environment as a natural system with a characteristic interface between soil, climate, flora and fauna, but a system on which the predominance of mankind had made a lasting mark.

This predominance brought about far-reaching departures from more natural ecosystems. Atmospheric and water pollution, compacted and sealed soil, over-building, lowering of the ground water level, climate changes and the threat to or extinction of entire species of flora and fauna were symptomatic of these departures yet conveyed an incomplete impression of their magnitude.

Take climate changes brought about by building. As a result of building patterns the mean wind speed in towns was 10 to 20 per cent lower than in un-built environments, said Professor Horbert.

On clear summer days in particular the difference in relative humidity can be up to 10 per cent. Poorer ventilation leads to more clouds, up to 15 per cent less sunshine and an average 10 per cent more rainfall.

Large city parks can help to offset this climate deterioration to a certain extent. But they will only do so when a number of ecological considerations are taken into account at the planning stage.

Parks must have wind corridors, otherwise they may not only prevent any improvement in environmental climate; they could well perpetuate topsy-turvy weather conditions accompanied as a rule by a high level of toxins in the lower reaches of the atmosphere.

These are conditions in which the lower reaches are colder than the air above. This impedes or even prevents entirely atmospheric circulation and the movement of toxins.

Poorly ventilated parks can heighten this effect because the temperature in them is perceptibly lower than in their built-up surroundings.

Wide roads are totally unsatisfactory as wind corridors. Far from encouraging a breath of fresh air through the park, they merely enrich the park air with harmful substances released into the atmosphere by road transport. They thus also seal off large areas of the city's surface. These few examples must suffice to show that a perceptible improvement in the living conditions of man, flora and fauna can be brought about by taking ecological considerations into account in town planning. What is more, it need not be expensive. Yet cost is a problem, not only in Germany but also in other European countries, the symposium revealed. In his opening address Professor Wolfgang Haber of Munich Technical University, Weihenstephan, president of the Ecological Society, said social renewal must be followed by ecological renewal of the urban environment.

There can be no question of this demand yet having been fulfilled. The most that can be said is that a start may have been made: in Central Poland, for instance.

A Polish delegate explained that a vegetation chart had been compiled for central areas of his country. Its utilisation recommendations had at least in part been borne in mind in development planning by smaller towns.

Proposals to bring about a change in this state of affairs ranged from deliberate infiltration of planning authorities by ecologists to intensified public relations activity and the entry of ecologists into politics.


The symposium, attended by about 400 experts from 18 countries, showed however that substantially less detailed scientific knowledge is available about urban ecosystems than about their natural counterparts.

Until a few years ago ecologists were exclusively interested in the latter.

There is moreover a shortage of models to outline in a sufficiently exemplary manner the complex inter-relationships of the urban ecosystem while at the same time making points that can be taken into practical account by planners.

Marion Kern

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 January 1981)



Grass and sheep . . . efficient energy saver. (Photo: dpa)

Sheep on a hot turf roof

Can sheep safely graze on your roof? It is not as zany a question as you might think. A home-owner in Hanau, near Frankfurt, keeps sheep on his roof.

He is architect Jens Drefahl, whose roof is a neatly laid-out lawn kept in trim by the world's finest fourlegged lawnmowers.

It is not just original and an eye-catcher; it also cuts out the need for oil-fired central heating.

He laid his first roof in turf four years ago, primarly to outline a green and pleasant alternative to depressing concrete and plate glass.

Scientific trials have since shown, or so he claims, that his idea can also be converted into a first-rate energy-saver.

Éxperience too has shown that his grass roof, complete with its biological absorber system, is more efficient than either solar panels or heat exchangers.

It absorbs heat from the atmosphere, from humidity, rain and fog. It uses heat from nature's waste material. All told, he says, it is more effective as a heat-provider than any other system.

As part of a research project commissioned by the Bonn Housing Ministry he is now to design a dozen homes in Gross-Krotzenburg, also near Frankfurt, with lush green rather than dull tiles on their roofs.

The objective is to save fossil energy such as coal or oil and make better use of hitherto unused heating processes.

The lawn roof as an energy-saver combines, he says, a high net gain in energy, low installation costs and an attractive exterior.

At night and in winter, vegetation develops heat, Drefahl explains. As in photosynthesis heat is released and soil as a storage heater helps to balance daily variations in outside temperature.

Solar heat, stored in the turf during the day, makes it possible to run the heat pump at night on cut-rate current.

The system includes a network of plastic hosepipes beneath the turf that are filled with water and anti-freeze. A heat pump extracts the heat to heat water for heating and for the bathroom and kitchen.

Jens Drefahl is emphatic that his grass roof is no more expensive than tiling the roof in the conventional manner. The only extra expense is that of the water circulation, or drainage, system.

dpa

(Die Welt, 9 January 1981)

Arms exports

Continued from page 1

e development aid they receive from e industrialised world.

We no longer ought to persist in this madness. It would indeed be better and ss expensive to pay the Kiel shipyard orkers and the Krauss Maffei workers who make tanks in Munich civil service nsions for the rest of their lives.

Yet here come the Saudis, keen to y Leopards, Cheetahs, Martens and ther tracked vehicles made in West Germany. They are in a position to ace orders worth billions.

Saudi Arabia is also a major trading rtner, doing DM8.7bn in import-export trade with the Federal Republic. It a major oil supplier, accounting for 17 r cent of West Germany's oil imports. It is, moreover, a leading figure in the ternational monetary scene.

Without saying so openly, Riyadh is prepared to give Germany long-term ans at concessional rates, place major orders in the civil sector and invest heavily in West German companies.

Bonn must not base its decision on job considerations; it must be guided by foreign policy criteria.

Ever since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it too has been called on to play its part in containing the Soviet drive to expand in the Near East.

That is one consideration. The other is that since the 1973 October Revolution — the first oil crisis — safe, smooth supplies of oil at reasonable prices have been a consideration of overriding national interest.

Bonn must give the matter careful consideration. How stable is Saudi Arabia? Might it be destabilised in much the same way as Iran under the Shah by being overwhelmed with Western arms and military advisers?

Could it really play a new role between the superpowers, given our assistance? Would our supplies of oil really be safer, less expensive and more reliable in the long term?

These are the issues to be considered in the current debate. The Bonn government has three options, either to sell arms to anyone, to sell arms to noone outside Nato, as demanded by Helmut Schmidt in his 1969 book *Strategie des Gleichgewichtes* (Balance of Power Strategy), or to look on arms exports as an aspect of foreign, foreign trade and security policy.

The latter would, of course, have to include due consideration of Israel and the United States.

It is not an easy decision to take and must not be one. Whichever option is chosen, the decision must set aside considerations of Social Democratic domestic policy.

Theo Sommer

(Die Zeit, 16 January 1981)

■ THE CINEMA

Cameras roll as team avoids the bullets

Volker Schlöndorff, who hit international film headlines with his version of Günter Grass' *Die Blechtrommel* (The Tin Drum), is now working in the Lebanon, on the film of Nicolas Born's novel *Die Fälschung* (The Forgery).

Schlöndorff sees filming on exotic locations as a trend in German film making. The day he started shooting on *Die Fälschung*, his colleague Werner Herzog started work on his film about Brazilian Indians in the Amazon.

The centre of Beirut, where much of the filming takes place, was burnt out in the 1976 and 1978 civil wars. Bombed and blown to bits. It is a no-go area with a strict curfew at night.

Nocturnal curfew breakers tend to wind up dead.

Schlöndorff has been given permission to film, but this has not stopped his team being shot at twice. It was a case of mistaken identity because the soldiers did not realise that films were shot in the rain.

Schlöndorff says: "We had to negotiate with Syrians, Falangists, Palestinians and Lebanese before we got permission to film. In the end they all wanted us to produce the film here, so that people do not forget the Arabs."

Die Fälschung is about the Middle East correspondent of a major newspaper called Laschen. During the horrors of the Lebanese civil war, which he describes knowledgeably, coolly and objectively, Laschen begins to be tormented by doubts about what he is writing. He knows that the compression and organisation of his material is itself a falsification, which makes the description of the human suffering he sees impossible. At the same time he is worried that he may lose the awareness that he is forging reality.

He also comes to realise that his *marriage in Germany is a tissue of lies*. He forms a relationship with another woman in Beirut, a German working at the German embassy. This woman is so absorbed in oriental thinking and feeling that she wants to be an Arab herself. She longs for a child and adopts an Arab war orphan. In doing so, she breaks out of the relationship with Laschen.

Born established his reputation as novelist when *Die Fälschung* was published in autumn 1979. Two months after the novel was published, he died of cancer.

Schlöndorff has done a lot of research *on the real characters* on whom the characters are based. He has even tracked down the embassy clerk and the reporter.

The reporter, Kai Hermann, has completed the screenplay with Jean-Claude Carrière. The editorial conferences were filmed in the offices of the Hamburg news magazines *Stern* and *Spiegel*.

Laschen and the "Arab German" Ariane are played by Bruno Ganz and Hanna Schygulla. Photographer Hoffmann, a go-getter and the complete opposite of the doubter Laschen is played by Polish director Jerzy Skolimowski; the cameraman, as in *The Tin Drum*, is Igor Luther.

Asked how he was going to portray the hero's complex psychological development in the film, this almost insane doubt and questioning of his own identity, Schlöndorff said he would concentrate on filming the day-to-day action and the psychology would then take care of itself.

He wanted *to capture the biblical* light on the hills of the Lebanon, the romantic image of the orient celebrated in so many nineteenth century paintings.

"The idea of the orient that many of us have in our minds becomes visible in the lobby of the hotel where Laschen lives, in the flood of light which illuminates the 1,001 nights, the five-metre tall palms, the Arabian arches and ornaments. We transformed the Beirut casino into into this hotel lobby", he says.

"Beirut itself was like an American city or like Zurich. But now rows of skyscrapers are burnt out. No other country in the Middle East tried to be as American as Lebanon. And no other country was so destroyed."

Schlöndorff stressed that his main concern was the German hero who asked himself what he had to do with these events.

The Lebanese were very anxious to take part in the film and Schlöndorff has Lebanese working on the technical side and actors recruited from a Beirut theatre.

"I thought they would threaten me with guns to find out what is in the script or what kinds of parts they would have to play. But they are grateful that a film is being made about them at all and they all want parts. They feel despised."

Schlöndorff has been to Israel, too, and is fully aware of the apparently insoluble problems between the Israelis and the Arabs.

"There is a lot of death in *Die Fälschung* and Laschen realises how much he loves life. I would like to get this across", he says.

I asked if the film would be in the spare style of his Young Törless.

He said: "No probably *more like The Tin Drum*, but how should I know before it's finished?"

What language is spoken? "The Germans of course speak German among themselves. Almost all the *Lebanese* can speak French. Communication between them and the Germans takes place in a linguistic reduction typical of the situation." Shooting in Lebanon will take three months. Then there will be shooting in Hamburg and *Luneburg* Heath, where Laschen lives. *Die Fälschung* is due to be released in October. The costs of the *co-production*, financed by Hessian TV, the Film Subsidy Board and the Project Commission, will be about DM5m.

Brigitte Jeremias

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 7 January 1981)



Reporter Laschen runs for safety in war-torn Beirut . . . a scene from 'Die Fä[lschung]' (Photo: Unital)



Hanna Schygulla (as Lale Andersen) in 'Lili Marleen'. (Photo: Tobis)

Fassbinder's latest likely to keep controversy going

Rainer Werner Fassbinder's latest film, *Lili Marleen*, has just been released. And it is likely to be as controversial as his version of Döblin's *Berlin Alexanderplatz*.

The reasons, however, are different. In *Alexanderplatz*, the soul of the TV viewer seethed at the extreme nature of the photography, the tortured dwelling on a man's downfall, and the metaphysical inferno of the epilogue.

Clearly, Fassbinder has not had enough of torturing the viewer, who is apparently incapable of reaching for the switch and ending the agony.

In *Lili Marleen*, he has come up with a film about recent German history which he distorts into melodramatic comedy.

And in doing so, he is obviously inspired by the stylised melodrama, sentimentality, irony and radicalism of Douglas Sirks' films.

Fassbinder sees Nazi Germany as a pompous spectacle, a big flag and swastika show: the dream of frenzied bourgeois turned nightmarish reality. The Nazis made full use of their political and social power but at the same time unleashed pomp, glamour and perfect terror in a vain attempt to attain happiness.

Hanna Schygulla as Lale Ande[rsen ...] the catalyst of this dilemma and th[e ...] figure in the film.

Lili Marleen becomes one o[f the] smash hits of the second world w[ar ...] Hitler's Germany lavishes gifts and [hon]our on her.

But all this pomp and luxury [leaves] her cold.

Outwardly she allows herself [to be] corrupted, showing childish deli[ght in] her success, the gift of a magnifi[cent la]keside villa. *the prospect* of a me[eting] with Hitler.

The granting of all her wishes an[d her] delight in this cannot prevent he[r ...] remaining true to her seemingly [...]ed love to a Swiss Jew (played by [Gian]carlo Gianini) and conspiring agai[nst her] all-powerful backers.

Fassbinder's heroine *is innocen[t ...]* though she seems guilty. His m[...] seems to be that not even an enti[re ...] and all the riches of the earth ca[n cor]rupt her.

And *as the entire system* canno[t con]quer this one just woman, as thi[s im]mortal spark enables her to achie[ve the] superhuman — as in the final [...] when she has to ignore her love[r who] *has been arrested* by the Gestapo [...] not to give either of them away — [...] finally the system and not the indi[vidual] is doomed to die.

The question is whether film[goers] will be able to follow Fassbinder — [who] has a small part as resistance man [...]senborn — and screenplay author [...] fred Purzer as far as this point af[ter] the gaudy, sarcastic, grotesque and d[...] elements that have preceded it.

Certainly Fassbinder has *not* [...] the past in the classical West[...] TV manner.

But in his iconoclastic, [...] from thoughtless, distortions [...] soldiers' broadcasts, war events [...] life he has ignored virtually a[ll ...] realism and authenticity.

Lili Marleen takes bits and [...] Nazi reality and creates from [...] own world, its own cosmos w[ith its own] laws, in which do what Fassbi[nder ...]

For him Nazi Germany [...] and no less than [...] subjective vision functions [...] this scene just like Douglas Sirk [...]

Continued on page 14

CHILDREN

Handicap or just a learning problem? Premature judgements a danger

Frankfurter Allgemeine

One of the dangers of social reforms is that people are too readily classified as disabled, a seminar of school doctors in Düsseldorf has been told.

This change has led to more and more people being labelled as disabled, and thus being made outsiders.

The resulting stigma puts their future at risk.

Professor H. Bach suggested to the meeting that it would be better to make no judgement until it became possible to differentiate between shortcoming and severe disability.

Where children and juveniles are concerned, most handicaps are restricted to specific areas of performance and are usually just temporary learning difficulties.

This type of light handicap occurs with about 22 per cent of school children and should therefore not be labelled a learning disability until it becomes severe and long lasting.

This would presuppose extremely poor performance in a large number of areas — something which applies to only five per cent of school-age children.

Since it is not always easy to establish such a disability, Professor Bach suggested that the terms "handicap" or "susceptibility to problems" be used instead.

To prevent such learning handicaps from turning into genuine disabilities, children should be treated and rehabilitated.

But it is exactly here that medicine and pedagogy have failed. It is therefore not surprising that alcoholism among juveniles is rising.

Some 60 per cent of 14 to 15-year-olds regularly consume alcohol; and at least 10,000 juveniles are drug addicts. Many drop out of school.

Statistics show that the juvenile drug addict's attitude towards school is severely out of kilter. Many of these young people fail to get promoted and drop out.

Psychological and psychosomatic ailments are also on the rise among juveniles.

The Düsseldorf doctor and theologian Professor J. Meinhard of Petersberg-Fulda told the meeting that these rising illness figures were reflected in the rising number of successful and attempted suicides.

An estimated 14,000 children and juveniles attempted suicide in 1978; and the school plays a part in this development.

Like the place of work, Professor Meinhard said, the school plays a decisive role in shaping the destinies of these young people.

Whether or not school turns into a traumatic experience depends not only on the ability of the teachers but also on the performance of doctors.

Handicaps in children of school age are usually borderline cases between pedagogy and medicine. This sheds a light on the difficulties in treating learning and upbringing disorders because both doctors and teachers are inadequately trained to cope with the task.

Since the doctor's function is to deal with the biological and the physical — with that which can be cured — and the teacher with the psychological attitudes i.e. upbringing and education, what matters most is that the two disciplines cooperate.

But what really happens, Professor Meinhard told the meeting, is that a chaos of authority ensues and that "exceeding the authority of a specific discipline is turned into a principle."

Educationalists, social workers and social pedagogues engage in therapy as if they were ashamed of their professions. Doctors, on the other hand, dabble in pedagogy — with disastrous consequences.

This results in disastrous decisions which account for the fact that 30 to 50 per cent of the children attending special schools do not belong there at all.

The sweeping diagnosis of school stress, a favourite with doctors, makes students and teachers insecure. Those who constantly accuse the school of overtaxing the students and thus causing stress only promote low-grade performance and fear of school.

This overlapping is due to a wide-spread arrogance — among doctors as well.

Professor Bach cited the pioneer of prophylactic checkups for children, the Munich pediatrician Professor T.H. Hellbrügge, who said that pedagogy amounted to pure book learning: "The pediatrician thinks only of the *child*; and pedagogy almost invariably thinks of the school class."

Just as the educationalist is neither equipped nor authorised to prescribe medicine or an operation, the doctor should not interfere in educational concepts.

It is therefore wrong for the Medical Association to have demanded "that universal teaching methods be abolished in favour of synthetic methods for the teaching of reading."

Such incursions by doctors into matters of education are promoted by the fact that their services are more easily accessible through the National Health Service than are the services of psychologists and educationalists.

Moreover, many parents pin greater hopes on treatment with drugs than on extensive and lengthy pedagogical or social measures.

Doctors are also more readily prepared to diagnose an illness when parents complain about their children although the actual disorder is of a behavioural nature or due to a wrong evaluation of the child because of excessive expectations.

This applies particularly to the many behavioural disorders ranging from just plain naughtiness to alleged "sexual delinquency".

The fact that educationalists and doctors must cooperate in treating learning problems is underscored by the frequent meshing of psychological and physical disorders.

Physical handicaps frequently affect not only the learning ability but other psychological areas as well. And mental handicaps lead not only to educational consequences but are usually coupled with physical disabilities.

Although the Swiss psychiatrist Professor W. Züblin, who read a paper on "The Difficult Child", suggested that there was such a thing as "spoiled" children whose problems were solely due to wrong or nonexistent upbringing, many disorders are due to brain damage at birth.

Even if there are no neurological symptoms, and given normal intelligence, such children are frequently late in developing.

They suffer from poor memory and are subject to moods. Many of them are too passive while others tend to be excessively active. This can be aggravated by perception difficulties.

Such children have a learning handicap and their performance is far worse than their IQ would warrant.

They also frequently suffer from severe behavioural disorders because their slow development leads to conflicts with their environment. This, in turn, promotes changes in their social attitudes, leading to aggression, depression and psychosis.

They have a hard time integrating and are therefore poor students. This can be further aggravated by physical problems.

Since psychological disorders remain even once the brain function becomes normal as these children develop, it is essential that such psychological disorders be kept in check from [the] beginning.

As important as the doctor is [in diag]nosing physical disorders, whe[n it comes] to treating their consequences [they] only play a supporting role.

It is up to the teacher, [Professor] Züblin said, to do the lion's sha[re of the] work. But many doctors find it [hard] to accept this.

It is incomprehensible that [so little] attention is devoted to the prob[lem by] school doctors considering that [there are] 1.5 million children of pre-sch[ool age and] more than 12 million of school [age in] this country.

But doctors are becoming inc[reasingly] aware of the problem, which g[ives cause] to hope.

For the past six years there ha[ve been] regular seminars for school doc[tors in] addition to the annual Medical Co[ngress].

But, as Professor Meinhard su[ggested,] this would have to be expanded [to be]come a genuine forum. Rainer [...]

(Frankfurter Allgemeine [Zeitung] für Deutschland, 7 Janu[ary 1981])

Drop in scho[ol] standards, says teacher[s]

Education standards in both p[rimary] and secondary schools have d[ropped] over the past five years, says a te[achers'] spokesman.

Clemens Christians, president o[f the] German Teachers Association, [said] school pupils were no longer so [keen on] work.

And there were diminished de[mands] on them as a result of official ed[ucation] policy.

Few teachers would disagree [that] standards of five years ago could no[t] be maintained.

Herr Christians mentioned [North] Rhine Westphalia where a Hess[ian] group had surveyed English lesso[ns].

At an elementary level, the sta[ndards] had to be low enough for everyon[e to be] successful.

Secondary school pupils voc[abulary] requirement in the first four yea[rs had] been reduced by more than a third [from] 4,300 to 3,000 words.

Christians said that the childre[n were] naturally no less intelligent than [before] but the trend towards even lower [stand]ards has engendered an attitude th[at re]jects performance.

Many consider recreation much [more] important than school.

Herr Christians suggested th[at the] trend be gradually reversed. He sai[d] students should be guided in be[ing] integrated in a "learning grou[p"], overcoming their inertia and in [using] their brains. They must become [accus]tomed again to tackling and mast[ering] tasks.

In this connection he emphas[ised] demanded that school leaving c[ertifi]cates be streamlined again on the [basis] of uniform criteria of performance.

Acceptance of school leaving [certifi]cates without such criteria would [mean] a disintegration of our educatio[nal sys]tem.

He warned against any further [reduc]tion of standards. The intended [...] of the education budget by [...] bringing it up to DM92.4[...] was [...] solute minimum, he said, if [...] standards are at least to be mai[ntained ...]

There was much lost [...] up in vocational schoo[ls ...] areas of *gymnasium* [...]

(Die We[lt, ... J]anuary 1981)

HEALTH

Asbestos, a threat that comes in many forms

[H]orror stories about our poisoned or poisonous environment follow one [anot]her in almost daily succession, and [one] of the most persistent offenders is [asb]estos.

[A]sbestos is a raw material that is vir[tual]ly indispensable in any number of [artic]les in everyday use. It has also long [bee]n acknowledged as a cause of in[dustr]ial injury.

Industrial accident insurance schemes [intr]oduced in the mid-50s protective re[gul]ations to reduce the health risk for [wor]kers in the textile and clothing in[dust]ry of working with asbestos fibre.

Since 1973 there have been special [acc]ident prevention regulations in re[spe]ct of mineral dust as a health hazard. [Sin]ce 1979 spraying with products con[tai]ning asbestos has been prohibited.

But people who work in factories [w]here asbestos is processed or live near[b]y are by no means alone in being in [da]nger. It is a largely unknown fact that [vir]tually all of us inhale or swallow [co]untless dangerous asbestos fibres every [da]y.

Asbestos recently made news with a [re]port that Bonn Interior Minister Ger[h]art Baum had recommended an [am]endment to the asbestos report draft[e]d by the Federal Environment Agency.

The draft advised a total ban on as[be]stos in 5 to 10 years. Herr Baum had [hi]s recommendation quietly written out [of] the report.

The newspaper that commented on [th]is news snippet inferred that the Min[iste]r had done so in deference to the [ind]ustrial lobby or because he felt a ban [wo]uld jeopardise too many jobs.

The Interior Ministry promptly denied [th]is allegation. It had not been Herr [Ba]um who was against the specific rec[om]mendation but Heinrich von Lersner, [he]ad of the Federal Environment Agen[c]y.

Herr von Lersner had preferred not to [be] specific because a ban in 5 or 10 [ye]ars' time was too inflexible a proposal. [In] certain sectors asbestos might have to [be] banned earlier.

Asbestos is a fibrous mineral that is [he]at-resistant and in many cases acid-re[si]stant and can be spun. It is mined [ma]inly in Canada, the Soviet Union and [So]uth Africa.

It is used in heating and electrical in[su]lation, fireproofing, filters, brake [lin]ings and a large number of building [m]aterials.

At a 1978 hearing on atmospheric [po]llution held by the Federal Environ[m]ent Agency in West Berlin about [...]000 people were said to be employed [in] asbestos processing in the Federal [R]epublic of Germany.

On average 80 cases of asbestosis, a [lu]ng complaint caused by asbestos fibre, [ar]e acknowledged annually by industrial [inj]ury tribunals.

There were also about 20 cases a year [of a]sbestosis combined with lung cancer. [M]esothelioma, a less frequent malignant [g]rowth in the lining of the stomach or [th]e chest, is also attributed to asbestos [...].

International surveys show that asbes[tos] workers who smoke run a particular[ly] high risk of contracting lung cancer.

[B]ut asbestos dust is a health hazard [n]ot only for people who work with this [ve]rsatile mineral, [said] Professor Beck of Giessen noted at the Berlin hearing. Asbestos in the air we all breathe, he said, was the result of its increasing use in building materials, such as asbestos cement and insulation.

US surveys had shown that stone containing asbestos, as used in roadbuilding, was worn down by traffic and gradually released asbestos dust into the atmosphere.

Various kinds of filter that rely on asbestos were also a source of the dangerous dust. In rooms kept germ-free by filters inhalable fibres from the filter material had been identified in the air.

Professor Borneff of Mainz University department of hygiene mentioned yet another problem. Inhalation of asbestos dust was dangerous, but so was its intake via the mouth.

"It is," he said, "a well-known fact that every bottle of wine contains a not inconsiderable number of asbestos fibres. That is why the filter industry is currently trying to convert its systems.

"The aim is to arrange collodium filters behind the conventional asbestos card to cut off the fibre."

Water pipes made of asbestos cement were also suspected of being a health hazard. Water with a high calcium count could dissolve the binding agent, allowing asbestos fibre to pass into the drinking water.

Professor Beck conceded that asbestos fibre found its way into the stomach and intestines via drinking water and filtered beverages such as wine or beer.

Asbestos workers, he further allowed, seemed particularly prone to cancer of the stomach and intestines. But:

"We do not know and it has yet to be shown whether asbestos fibre consumed orally plays any part in the frequency of cancer or mesothelioma." Experiments with laboratory animals had failed to establish a connection, which was not to say that oral intake of asbestos fibre was not a health hazard. But although fears were entirely justified they remained to be substantiated. The experts heard in Berlin were not yet prepared to be specific on ceiling recommendations.

But they clearly realised that bans would prove necessary in the foreseeable future. Bans, they felt, would need to be imposed on specific uses or methods of processing asbestos. It might need banning altogether in sectors where altenatives were available. There were any number of substitute materials, such as glass or slag fibre, but they too were carcinogenic.

The asbestos report is to be published at the end of January or early in February. It may not include prohibition recommendations but let us hope it will lay a groundwork for discussion of bans and for research on the subject.

Ada Brandes

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 11 January 1981)



Fallout practice

Rhineland-Palatinate is the first *Land* to put through its paces an emergency treatment centre for nuclear fallout victims, at Hassloch, near Ludwigshafen. Civil defence officers and 120 schoolchildren practised first aid to people living in the immediate vicinity of a reactor that was assumed to have leaked. Children are here seen taking a decontamination shower and drying themselves with disposable towels. (Photo: dpa)

Cadmium pollution report referred to Bundestag

Bonn Interior Minister Gerhart Baum has submitted to the Bundestag the cadmium report drawn up by the Federal Environment Agency.

The report outlines the health hazard of cadmium-polluted food and counter-measures such as bans on its use.

The soil is so heavily polluted by cadmium that, as Herr Baum told the Bundestag at the end of November, far-reaching measures will prove indispensable.

That was before the report was published. The cadmium report lists the options open to politicians by way of counter-measures.

It is also brutally frank about the present position. Cadmium is highly toxic for warm-blooded animals and also attacks plants. Man as the last link in the food cycle is in the greatest danger.

Cadmium is thought to be a carcinogen. Surveys of Japanese people exposed to high cadmium concentration have shown how dangerous it can prove over a longer period.

Its repercussions can include malfunction of the kidneys and lungs, anaemia and bone damage.

Cadmium, the report says, has been found in nearly all food. Milk has the lowest cadmium count, liver, kidneys and some mushrooms and molluscs have the highest.

What is more, acid rainfall caused by sulphur dioxide from factories, domestic heating and motor vehicles in on the increase.

This increases the amount of cadmium absorbed by plants from the soil, thereby further increasing the cadmium count in the food we eat.

Cadmium consumption by industry has increased by leaps and bounds in recent decades. It is extremely useful as an anti-corrosion additive for metals, in the manufacture of paint resistant to high temperatures and in making certain synthetics and batteries.

More than 10 per cent of the annual world output of 20,000 tonnes is said to be consumed in the Federal Republic.

In the long term cadmium could, the report says, become a serious risk to health in general. Complaints do not usually occur until 20 or 30 years after exposure.

So the Federal Environment Agency outlines what can be done to counteract the high cadmium count in sewage and sludge, in the air and in phosphate fertilisers. It also lists alternative materials.

Starting this year, for instance, the Effluent Levy Act will charge industry for the cadmium it pumps into the sewage network.

But the foremost objective must be to convert production processes to prevent cadmium from being pumped into the sewage in the first place.

The use of high-cadmium sewage sludge as a fertiliser certainly needs curbing drastically.

Lower statutory limits for cadmium in the atmosphere ought also to reduce atmospheric pollution once the 1978 clean air regulations are introduced.

Improved clean air installations for exhaust fumes are indispensable. They can be installed at old steel foundries.

Since phosphate fertilisers are thought to be a principal source of cadmium pollution the Federal Environment Agency recommends ending this black spot as soon as possible by means of purchase and processing agreements.

In the long term, however, processes by which fertilisers could be manufactured without cadmium needed to be developed.

The report is somewhat evasive on alternatives to cadmium in industrial use. It merely recommends the use of plastics for which cadmium is not required as a stabiliser, for instance.

As for cadmium used to harden parts for shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture, the report does no more than sound a note of hope.

The present position, it says, is far from clear, but cadmium could be dispensed with in a number of uses.

Gerda Strack

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 January 1981)

■ CIVIL UNREST

Dissatisfaction over housing erupts in street riots



It was not only fireworks that accounted for the noise in Göttingen on New Year's Eve.

Shortly after midnight, a mob of more than 100 in an ugly mood inflamed by drink, broke windows ans looted stores in the main street of the university town.

Police reinforcements were called as foot patrols became heavily outnumbered.

In the aftermath, insurance companies and businessmen are disputing whether the looting is burglary (which is covered by unsurance) or civil commotion (which is not).

Yet the police should not have been so unprepared for the trouble. It had been fomenting for weeks.

During the night of 12 December squatters occupied an empty house in the city centre. In a nearby disused school they set up what they called a communications centre which was nothing but a glorified pub: the "Prague School" was thus turned into a "Kraak School", a reference to Dutch squatters.

It seems obvious that the Göttingen squatters modelled themselves on Amsterdam squatters who have tried for years to draw attention to the housing shortage and who made headlines with their riots during the April coronation festivities.

A poster reading "We're Kraaking" should have served as a warning. Another poster — obviously referring to poland — consisted of the single word: "Solidarity."

Little became known as to how much solidarity there was behind the newly painted green facade.

In any event, the New Year's Eve riots do not seem to have been planned and coordinated for not only the police but the demonstrators as well were caught without the usual crash helmets when violence escalated.

The fact that the squatters admitted having broken only two of the shop windows — those which they felt could somehow be justified politically — and said that they had nothing to do with the looting shows that they knew very well that the night's rioting had lost them much of the sympathy that had been built up among the public — sympathy they had earned not only because they restored a house declared as uninhabitable in record time.

The whole affair has highlighted several shortcomings on the part of city planning during the past decades in the centre of Göttingen.

It is the city planning authority that is responsible for the change in the appearance of the city and hence for life in it. Its work has been marked by continuity rather than flexibility.

The authority has been headed by the same man since 1961 (an SPD member). But his star began to sink when the FDP decided to vote with the CDU because that party at a recent election of the city administrator had seen to it that the FDP candidate was put in charge of the administration. His liberalism was put to a tough test by the squatters.

They picked a worthwhile house for their *instandbesetzung* (a play on words that can best be translated as repair-and-squat). The four-storey timbered building is well over 100 years old and far from derelict. It is only neglected.

Its former beauty was simply hidden by neglect. As a result, the people in charge of national monuments overlooked the house.

They did not become aware of it until the squatters took over (there are not many houses of this type left in Göttingen) when they declared it a national monument.

This has dashed the plans of its owner who wanted to tear the building down and can now no longer do so.

This was an obvious success for the squatters who are not only trying to combat the housing shortage but also the further demolition of buildings in the city centre.

But the fact that a house has been declared a national monument does not necessarily protect it from demolition in Göttingen, as several examples show — examples that have not only harmed the appearance of the city but also the public's faith in the city fathers.

The beginning of the end was marked by the demolition of the hippodrome built by King George II in 1735. The neoclassical structure that had to give way to a department store was one of the major landmarks of Göttingen. All that remains is the portal which now graces the entrance to a parking lot.


The hippodrome is the symbol of a policy that has turned the sleepy university town on the edge of the Harz mountain range into a Lower Saxony business centre. The small seat of learning that weathered the war unscathed has thus become a mini metropolis.

A senior member of the planning authority says: "Economic development was given priority."

Meanwhile, it has become difficult to find takers for the newly built luxury apartments in the city centre. They were erected in exactly the place where reasonably priced housing is most needed.

A whole borough in the old city had to be razed to make room for a third department store which will not be built after all because another big shopping centre proved such a flop that nobody wants to rent the individual shops at any price.

The East Ring that was to have encroached on the built-up city area and for which a humber of beautiful buildings were torn down will probably be scrapped. None of this has done much for Göttingen, even though that a new history consciousness is mightily in evidence, expressing itself in a drive to bring back to the city what it wantonly destroyed, i.e. the old timbered houses. Mock timbered facades are now going up even in those areas of the inner city where they never existed before, while in those places that traditionally had these buildings they had to give way to monotonous new structures. Granted, even Göttingen has learned from its mistakes and now no longer equates rehabilitation with total demolition and new construction.



Göttingen squatters getting the message across. (Photo

The second major rehabilitation programme in the inner city around St. John's Church treats old buildings with more care.

But this does not change the fact that these programmes that go under the magic word "rehabilitation" alter the structure of our cities — and not only in Göttingen.

Rehabilitation does not only drive tenants out of their homes for the time reconstruction takes but usually for good because the renovation not only makes the houses more beautiful and more modern but also considerably more expensive.

Yet what the city centre needs is cheap housing — especially in view of the fact that the number of students has doubled in the past 10 years to almost 25,000.

Even now, in mid-semester, half of the students are without proper accomodation while others live in places that are much too expensive or out in the country near the border with East Germany; and their commuting has aggravated city parking problems.

A study shows that the students have to pay between 25 and 33 per cent of their incomes or allowances just for a roof over their heads — accommodation with which most are dissatisfied anyway.

One in three would prefer group living; but this would require large apartments suitable for families which are virtually unavailable in the inner city.

What angers both those looking for apartments to rent and the squatters is the large number of unoccupied houses in the city centre.

The cause of anger is the large number of unoccupied housing units in the centre.

According to the city administration, there are 20 buildings with unoccupied quarters; the squatters say there are many more.

Whatever the number, many have been empty for years, waiting for either renovation or demolition. Being [...] only accelerates the process of [...]tion.

Other houses are unoccupied be[...] their owners don't know what [...] with them, as demonstrated by the [...]torious example of an eccentric old [...] who simply does not feel like re[...] her large and well preserved apar[...] houses.

The fact that she has so far succ[...] in avoiding fines shows the ineffi[...]ness of recent legislation.

The squatters have now given the [...] lady who so cleverly evades the law [...] cause she wants to tear her pro[...] down to erect a parking garage a [...] warning". They painted the "[...] "We're coming" on the facade.

The handful of young squatters [...] have meanwhile been joined by [...] intend to stay for a long time and [...] to obtain leases. But so far all they [...] received is a summons for an ev[...] hearing in court.

The idea these people have of [...]fortable living is not shared by ev[...]dy and cannot be realised in the [...] apartments of new buildings or in [...]gant old apartment houses. They [...] live among pieces of furniture [...] others have discarded.

Our society, which otherwise [...] be as liberal as possible, has syste[...]cally narrowed this type of scope in [...] wake of sweeping modernisation [...]grammes in city centres.

Those who cannot afford one of [...] expensive comfortable new apartm[...] and do not want to move to the sub[...] or the country to pursue an altern[...] lifestyle in one of the many co[...] communes are hard put to find [...] convivial city centre accommodation.

The squatters therefore demand [...] only that the unoccupied apartments [...] let; they also want communal living [...] working.

Although this wish is not unrea[...] able it still seems utopian in our cit[...] And utopias cannot be made to co[...] true by violence.

Monika [...]

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Ze[...] für Deutschland, [...] January 19[...])

Fassbinder's latest

Continued from page 10


the Texas of the oil millionaires in *Written in The Wind*.

Lili Marleen is not an attempt to reconstruct an era — though it is an extremely expensive film — but uses its main structures as the backcloth to an individual fate. It is an ordinary, even everyday fate, magnified by the time in which it is enacted.

This is the essence of Sirk's melodramas, the influence of which is nowhere in Fassbinder's work more evident than here.

Eckhart Schmidt

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 9 January 1981)



SPORT

Improving volleyball women step into the limelight

[...]est Germany's volleyball girls are [...]not often asked for autographs [...]their signatures do not yet rate very [...]y among autograph-hunters.

[...] they are still legible, and most [...] members add their jersey number [...]ackets; their faces are not yet a [...] quantity either.

[...]can only be a matter of time, how[...] and the squad are certainly deter[...]d to gain acclaim for names such [...]vla Meiertoens, Marina Staden, Si[...] Terriegge and Ute Moser.

[...] 1978, at the last world champion[...] the West German women came [...] A year later they were ninth, albeit [...] European championships.

[...]t year they put up a spirited per[...]ance against the Soviet Union, the [...]ple gold medallists, in a tourna[...]t at Varna, Bulgaria, only yielding [...] five tough sets.

[...]his year, at the New Year tourna[...]t in Bremen, they beat Brazil a con[...]ing 3-1. The Brazilian girls came se[...]h at Moscow and last year the West [...]man team were jubilant at having [...] only narrowly to them.

[...]ey lost 3-2 to Cuba, but the world [...]mpions were clearly shaken, while it [...] the all-conquering Chinese girls [...] an hour to eliminate the hosts.

[...]hat *counts for* something. The Chi[...] won the tournament without a [...] conceding not a single set to their [...]ents. Cuba and West Germany [...] second and third.

[...] China was so successful that the [...] it took them to beat the others [...] to be viewed as a yardstick. They [...] between 36 and 47 minutes to [...]ck out Belgium, Cuba and Brazil, for [...]ance.

[...]his was roughly the length of time [...] spent warming up before each [...]h in Bremen, where they must su[...] have felt at home.

[...]nce 1977 they have regularly either [...]d Germany or hosted the German [...] in China.

[...] will not have been merely a matter [...] the placards plastering the walls of [...] university where the tournament was [...]. The Bremen public has also taken [...]rticular liking to the Chinese girls.


[...]n the day China had no game th[...] [...] was almost empty, whereas at the [...]end hundreds were turned away and [...] had their ticket money refunded [...]use the hall was full to overflowing.

[...]he Volleyball Association must by [...] be accustomed to crowds and the [...]ing troubles associated with growth. [...] has only been in existence for 25 [...] yet seems to have been through [...] a century's worth of affairs.

[...]he association and its member-clubs [...] not always seen eye to eye. They [...] side by side but often in rivalry, [...] first one way, then the other by [...]ion and the attraction exerted by [...] spot.

[...] this is merely by the way, al[...]gh it is by no means an unimpor[...] part of the background. It requires [...] imagination to realise that organi[...] rivalry will make its mark on [...] of play.

[...] have now begun to put [...] to these sore points of the past by virtue of their growing international stature, which is more than can be said of the men.



This improvement in performance at the top does no more than reflect a growth in membership over the past 10 years or so that has made it difficult for the association to retain control over events.

Membership has increased by 15 per cent a year to more than 250,000, and the peak does not yet seem to have been reached.

The same is probably true of the national squad, where professionalism is only just beginning to take over from the leisure aspect of a burgeoning sport.

There are regional coaching centres and a German Volleyball Foundation. There are advertising panels on team jerseys and players are induced by more than mere sporting considerations to transfer from one club to another.

There are guest stars from abroad and there is the glare of publicity, but it would be premature to suppose that results are already apparent in the national team's showing.

Even in a sport that is growing as fast as volleyball it would be a little early in the day to make this assumption.

A closer look needs to be taken at the team line-ups in a tournament such as Bremen. It will soon be seen that the glamour and glitter are a little exaggerated.

The fans got their money's worth, however, which is saying something at DM15 a time per adult. The Chinese girls with an artistry reminiscent of the Harlem Globetrotters were well worth seeing.

So were the Cuban and Brazilian girls, and between them they produced an array of exotic names ranging from Ping Lang to Regine de Uchoa.

Tall girls some of them were, too, unless you happen to be taller than 1.80m (5ft 10in) yourself. But the tournament was little more than a training session for the leading countries.

The hosts obviously took it much more seriously than many of their opponents. The leading countries sent promising youngsters, 16- to 18-year-olds, to Bremen.

Germany would be only too happy if it had promising youngsters in this age group, whereas many of the others looked on the entire tournament as no more than a useful training session (which is all it really was).

This is not to detract from the importance of the occasion. At the top training seems to be all-important in volleyball. For the women a point has been reached at which only practice, practice and more practice can improve on performance.

If 500 smash hits a day are no longer enough to hold one's own against the opposition, then it will have to be 1,000. The Chinese and Russians are past masters at this kind of approach.

They are said to spend a 40-hour week in training. In Germany the long-term target is 20 hours volleyball a week.

It was very kind of a member of the friendly Chinese delegation in Bremen to forecast than in two years' time the German girls would no longer derive satisfaction from narrow defeats.

They would then be in line for European championship victories, he said, but it is hard to see what grounds he may have had for these kind words.

Herr Mader, president of the German Volleyball Association, would first like to see the Bremen tournament become an annual event of greater importance.

He would also like to see an increase in the number of full-time trainers employed by clubs and associations. The Bonn Interior Ministry may have imposed a ban on hiring new national coaches, but that is unlikely to stop the volleyball advance.

Even so, women members of the national squad will for some time still need to add their jersey number in brackets to their autograph.

Oskar Schmidt

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 8 January 1981)

Only a matter of time for the West German girls. (Photo: Sven Simon)


Marina Staden

Hübner loses his chance

Hopes that a German chess player would challenge world champion Anatoli Karpov of the Soviet Union have been dashed.

Cologne grand master Robert Hübner, 32, who was trailing by three-and-a-half to four-and-a-half points, threw in the towel in the final of the candidates' tournament in Merano, Italy, on 9 January.

He withdrew and conceded defeat to former Soviet grand master Victor Korchnoi. Yet at one stage Hübner was a point ahead.

The news that he had withdrawn with 8 of the 16 games still to play will have hit the Soviet Union like a bombshell. Soviet emigré Korchnoi will be challenging Karpov, 29, again.

Since leaving the Soviet Union in 1976 Korchnoi, who now lives in Zurich, has been a persona non grata for the Soviet authorities.

Two years ago he lost 6-5 to Karpov in a nerve-racking 32 games in Baguio, in the Philippines. The world champion escaped defeat by the skin of his teeth.

Last year, in the qualifying rounds, Korchnoi eliminated Petrosian and Polugaevski, both Soviet grand masters.

Dr Hübner's withdrawal will have come as a surprise to chess fans in Germany and elsewhere.

At the start of the final against Korchnoi in Merano he conveyed a relaxed impression and beat Korchnoi in the first game.

But the seventh game was clearly the turning point. Hübner was leading but lost after an elementary mistake.

His nerves seem to have been shaken. His manager Wilfried Hilgert said so with reference to German media reports and was supported by Alban Brodbeck, Korchnoi's lawyer.

Dr Brodbeck, a Swiss solicitor, said at a Merano press conference that "half-truths degraded chess contests to duels between schizophrenics and neurotics."

Hilgert said Hübner had been particularly upset by an article in *Der Spiegel*, the Hamburg news weekly. He reckoned it had affected Hübner's performance in the fateful seventh game.

Hübner's managers also attributed defeat in the eighth game to outside influences, on this occasion a journalist intruding in the bar where Hübner was relaxing.

dpa

(Kieler Nachrichten, 10 January 1981)